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Forord 
 
 
I April 2006 afholdte Center for Tourism and Culture Management på Copenhagen Business School 
en conference med titlen “Airways 06”. Artikler samt præsentationer fra konferencen findes på 
hjemmesiden www.cbs.dk/tcm. 
 
Efter konferencen er der blevet udtrykt ønske om, at nogle artikler kom til at foreligge i en trykt 
version. Der drejer sig om artiklerne: ”Airline Profitability: Business Model Nuances and Financial 
Impact” af Kristian Hvass, og ”Turbulens og strategi i luftfartsbranchen med fokus på SAS og Air 
France/KLM” af Lise Lyck, hvilke ligger til grund for nærværende publikation.  
 
Kristian Hvass er Ph.d.-studerende på Center for Tourism and Culture Management med speciale i 
luftfart. Han opholder sig i efteråret 2006 på University of California, og er også ansat i SAS. 
 
Lise Lyck er centerleder på Center for Tourism and Culture Management på Copenhagen Business 
School, og er vejleder for Kristian Hvass.  
 
Det er hensigten at afholde en Airways 07 i marts 2007. Dette vil blive annonceret på TCM´s 
hjemmeside, www.cbs.dk/tcm. 
 
Centerleder 
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Airline Profitability: Business Model Nuances and Financial Impact 
Kristian Hvass 
Center for Tourism and Culture Management, Copenhagen Business School 
Solbjerg Plads 3.03 
2000 Frederiksberg 
+45 3815 3454 
kah.tcm@cbs.dk 
 
 
Abstract: Business model development at low-cost and full-service airlines throughout the years 
has led to a departure from the original models. The low-cost model is shifting up-market to capture 
higher yield traffic, while the full-service model is adopting low-cost model elements to achieve 
optimization. This paper determines how the degree of adherence to either original model impacts 
the profit level of low-cost carriers and full-service carriers. The methodology studies 26 North 
American and European airlines, 12 low-cost and 14 full-service, and evaluates each polarized 
group’s 2004 product and operational features against the original models. Evaluation occurs on an 
ordinal scale and is derived from secondary data sources to present the level of transition from the 
original model. Analyses results show that profit levels are directly correlated to adherence to the 
original model, at both extremes, while those carriers diverging most from the traditional models 
experience lower profit levels.  
 
Keywords: Business models; low-cost carriers; airlines; industrial classification; strategic options 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Airline profitability fluctuation is partly attributed to a carrier’s selected business model. Various 
incumbent airlines are attempting to integrate some characteristics from successful lower cost 
models, while some low-cost airlines are competing for market share via differentiation. The 
majority of research has focused on the effectiveness of one model versus another, namely low-cost 
carriers (LCCs) compared to incumbent full-service carriers (FSCs) (Calder, 2002; Franke, 2004; 
Lawton, 2002; Vlaar et al., 2005). However, the literature is prone to classify two rigid typologies, 
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LCCs and FSCs or some similar nomenclature, and force an airline into one of the two categories. 
This type of stringent classification fails to highlight business model nuances that airlines have 
chosen in an attempt to compete successfully. Alamdari and Fagan (2005) address this by 
quantifying LCCs’ deviation from the original business model. However, there is a research gap as 
FSCs’ model adaptations and profitability impact have been neglected. This paper addresses the gap 
by comparing the 2004 models of 26 (12 LCCs and 14 FSCs) North American and European 
airlines with the two traditional models found in the classical bi-typology regime. The results show 
that there is a large deviation from the traditional models, especially among LCCs, and that there is 
a positive correlation between the degree of model adherence and profitability.  
 
For clarity this paper is divided into six sections. To ensure an initial broad understanding among 
readers business model, LCC, and FSC definitions are presented. An explanation of the aspects 
measured and the methodology chosen follows. The analyses and results from the LCC study group 
are presented first, followed by the FSC carriers’ analyses results. Next, how the analyses results 
impact the profitability of an airlines’ chosen model is presented. Finally, closing remarks and 
implications are presented and discussed. 
 
2. Background 
 
A company’s strategy is reflected and implemented in its business model. While strategy mirrors a 
company’s overall long-term direction, the business model is the short-term strategic actualization 
in how its products and/or services are brought to market. A business model takes into consideration 
a company’s resources, activities, and customer offering (Afuah, 2004; Hedman & Kalling, 2003). 
The concept is commonly linked with the influx of e-business (Afuah & Tucci, 2001; Timmer, 
1998; Weill & Vitale, 2001), however as Magretta (2002) explains, every company needs a good 
business model, which, in essence, is a narrative of how it serves its customers and earns money. 
Within the airline industry it has been a common belief that there are two main business models 
among scheduled passenger airlines: a low-cost carrier model and a full-service carrier model. 
These taxonomies have common synonyms. LCCs are also referred to as no-frills airlines, value-
for-money airlines, or point-to-point carriers (Calder, 2002; Cassani & Kemp, 2003; Lawton, 2002; 
Lee & Luengo-Prado, 2004; O'Connell & Williams, 2005). Its opposite partner is the FSC, also 
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coined a traditional carrier, incumbent, a hub-and-spoke airline, a network carrier, or a flag carrier. 
To provide uniformity this article will utilize the terms low-cost carrier and full-service carrier. 
The LCC business model is described as an operation that: 
• Offers short-haul routes 
• Operates a single-aircraft type 
• Offers high-density seating 
• Operates from secondary airports as much as possible 
• Achieves a high frequency 
• Sells 100% of tickets through call-centers and websites and is ticket-less 
• Offers buy-on-board catering and generates additional revenue through secondary sources 
• Offers unrestricted, point-to-point fare structures 
• Avoids transfer traffic 
• Outsources functions when possible 
 
Southwest Airlines in the United States is accredited with creating the world’s first low-cost carrier 
in 1971, which soon blossomed and has achieved an impressive customer satisfaction and financial 
record since its founding. The airline has since been a guide for aspiring LCCs throughout the 
world, such as Ryanair and easyJet in Europe, WestJet and JetBlue in North America, Gol in South 
America, and Air Asia and Tiger Airways in Asia (Thomas, 2005).  
 
At the other end of the spectrum is the full-service carrier model that is the remnant from days of 
regulated markets and monopolies. The FSC business model typically consists of: 
• Regional, short, and long-haul routes 
• A fleet to meet a regional, short, and long-haul network 
• 2-class seating: first and economy 
• Operates from primary airports 
• The highest frequency allowable with a connection-driven network 
• Third party and own distribution channels 
• Complimentary on-board amenities 
• Restricted and discounted, through-fare structures 
• Online and interlining connections 
• Functions completed in-house when possible  
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This model grew under protection of a state regulated market umbrella. However, deregulation 
removed the protective covering and allowed LCCs to flourish. Since 2004 LCCs have captured 
24% of the domestic available seat kilometers (ASK) in North America, 36% in Canada, and 19% 
in the intra-European market (Cassotis, 2005; Newman, Duxbury, & Peng, 2005). 
 
Competition within the marketplace is growing fiercer. Currently, LCCs must not only compete 
with FSCs but also the plethora of other airlines mimicking the Southwest model. To achieve 
differentiating competitive advantages LCCs have been adapting the business model to attract new 
customers and segments and to generate additional revenue from those flying (Thomas, 2005). 
FSCs though are not to be disregarded as these airlines are reacting by also adapting their models, 
sometimes by incorporating LCC characteristics. It is these business model adaptations that make 
the current dual airline categorization inadequate and complicate profitability expectations. 
2.1 Methodology 
 
Business models consist of three broad elements: resources, activities, and a customer offering 
(Hedman & Kalling, 2003). 15 airline business model characteristics (13 for FSC) are measured 
among the chosen study group carriers which address one or more of the business model elements. 
The business model characteristics analyzed include:  
Product features -  
Network and tickets: charter, connections, through-fares, and trip restrictions 
Service: in-flight service, in-flight classes, reward amenities, seat assignments, and airport selection 
Distribution: distribution, customer segmentation, and alliances 
Operational features -   
Fleet, aircraft utilization, and stage length 
 
Each characteristic is evenly weighted and given a score relative to the similarity with the original 
LCC and FSC business model as discussed earlier. An identical characteristic is given a score of 2; 
a similar characteristic is scored with a 1; an entirely different characteristic scores 0. The 
maximum score an LCC can achieve is 30 (15 x 2 = 30) while an FSC can achieve a maximum of 
26 (13 x 2 = 26). The variance between the number of FSCs characteristics measured is due to 
omission of two characteristics because of the lack of differentiation. The total scores for all carriers 
are indexed to 100 and a carrier with a full adherence will achieve this maximum score. The 
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quantification of an airline’s business model enables the visualization of strategic reflection and 
implementation and measured deviation from the original model. 
 
3. Low-Cost Carrier Business Model 
3.1 Product Features 
 
Networks and ticketing. The route network is the foundation upon which an airline is built, and is 
the essential core of the service offered. LCCs typically offer only scheduled service and no 
connections, through-fares, or trip restrictions, however model variance occurs. North American 
LCCs focus solely on scheduled traffic1, with the exception of WestJet. In Europe Air Berlin and 
Sterling aggressively seek charter contracts, unlike the other LCC study group airlines. One 
explanation may be the limited utilization of charter services among U.S. travelers, while Canadian 
and European travelers are more accustomed to the travel form. On-line and inter-line connection 
possibilities are built into some LCC networks, such as Southwest, Frontier, America West, Air 
Berlin, and Sterling. Southwest offers both on- and inter-lining with partner ATA, while Frontier 
has built up long-term partnerships with smaller feeder airlines. JetBlue and WestJet have created 
focus cities on both sides of the continent and offer on-lining. The U.S. domestic market is the 
largest in the world and as LCC networks expand it may be beneficial to offer on-lining and inter-
lining capabilities to more easily shift traffic within the network. Air Berlin and Sterling offer on-
line and inter-line capabilities with their partner airlines, while Aer Lingus is the only self-
proclaimed LCC in a global alliance. 
 
The majority of LCCs offer some form of discount for connecting and traveling onward through out 
the network, with the exception of Ryanair, easyJet, and Aer Lingus. Such restrictive policies are 
reflective of attempts at pure point-to-point networks that are not conducive of promoting transfer 
traffic. A policy of through-fares may be indicative of a network capitalizing on transfer traffic, 
even among LCCs. Trip restrictions are ticket policies that restrict travel flexibility, and many 
travelers envision unrestricted and ease of travel with LCCs. However, many carriers incorporate 
varying degrees of restrictions, although the round-trip restriction has been eliminated. The older 
North American LCCs have retained tickets restrictions, which are not reflected among the new 
                                                 
1 The occasional charter flights, for example sports team charters, are not considered a model deviation; rather long-
term charter contracts, commonly with tour operators, are model deviations. 
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LCC entrants such as JetBlue and WestJet. Southwest airlines, for example, offers 7 different ticket 
options, each with various restrictions2. In contrast, all European LCCs have eliminated trip 
restrictions from their ticket classes, adhering more closely to the original business model. The 
networks and tickets of LCCs vary greatly, and some geographical segmentation is apparent, which 
may be related to historical travel preferences, time since founding, and varying geographical size.  
 
Services. The in-flight experience among LCCs has been greatly adapted over the years. It is not all 
LCCs that offer a single-class with high-density seating and economy class service. Some new 
entrants have been able to incorporate hi-tech offerings for their passengers, which in some cases is 
a better product than full-service carriers’ (Thomas, 2005). America West, Air Tran, and Spirit are 
the only LCCs in the study group that have elected to create a first class section in their aircraft, 
while the remaining airlines continue to adhere to the traditional single-class arrangement. The in-
flight service found among LCCs varies from spartan to more accommodating offerings. All North 
American LCCs continue to offer complimentary snacks and beverages, while JetBlue, Air Tran, 
and WestJet have installed either live television or satellite radio, offering more entertainment 
selections than FSCs. Among European LCCs it is only Air Berlin who stands out by offering 
complimentary snacks and beverages, while remaining competitors follow the original LCC model. 
Carriers, such as Ryanair and easyJet, have found that considerable ancilliary revenues can be 
earned during the travel experience, with Ryanair reporting ancillary sales accounting for 15% of 
total revenues and raising £4.95 per passenger in 2005 (Shifrin, 2006; Thomas, 2005). Reward 
amenities typically appear in the form of frequent flyer programs and lounge access, and the 
catalyst is the business traveler. As some LCCs shift focus towards higher yield passengers, 
amenities become a competitive parameter, which was a driver for Southwest’s frequent flyer 
program in 1987 (Lockwood, 2006). North American LCCs clearly distinguish themselves by all 
offering a frequent flyer program, with America West also offering lounge access. In Europe 
easyJet offers lounge access at numerous locations for a fee, while Air Berlin and Aer Lingus are 
the only European study group LCCs with a frequent flyer program. However, such programs may 
potentially be sources of significant revenue. This occurs through collaborative partner activities, 
evident among all of the analyzed LCCs. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of partners in the world’s 
top 20 LCC frequent flyer programs (Sorensen, 2005). 
                                                 
2 Conditions from March 2006 
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Partnerships with co-branded credit cards are a source of significant additional revenues, with some 
programs reportedly contributing nearly US$ 1 billion in revenues, and nearly all LCCs offer credit 
card options related to their programs. The only requirement that all LCCs have for their programs 
is that they be simple and not a cost burden, although it should not be ignored that revenue 
generation and increased yields are potential positive effects (Thompson, 2006). Seat allocation is 
an area of differing opinion among LCCs. Southwest follows the free-seating concept, which 
contributes to a quick turn-around facilitating greater aircraft efficiency. However, JetBlue has 
opted for traditional assigned seating, which may appeal to families or those traveling in groups. 
The remaining North American LCCs offer some form of seat requests or assigned seating. In 
contrast, many European LCCs have realized revenue gains from fee-generated assigned seating. 
Air Berlin takes a fee for those travelers not members of their frequent flyer program, while Ryanair 
planned to introduce similar features but decided against (Anonymous, 2006). The original LCC 
model calls for service to secondary airports, however not all adhere to this practice. All North 
American LCCs serve a mix of primary and secondary airports, and nearly all carriers have 
established a hub at a primary airport, for example Southwests’ Las Vegas (LAS) or Frontier’s 
Denver (DEN) hub, while servicing both primary and secondary destinations. JetBlue has 
successfully built hubs at two locations on both coasts of the U.S., with New York (JFK) as a 
primary location, the other being Los Angeles (LGB). In Europe it is Ryanair who follows the LCC 
model most stringently, with majority of service to secondary locations, while easyJet has built a 
model that serves many primary airports throughout mainland Europe. The LCC model calls for 
Figure 1: Share of FFP partners by category for the world’s top 20 LCCs (2004) (Sorensen, 2005) 
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high frequency operations to maximize utilization of assets, however as Figure 2 shows, variance is 
to be found. 
 
 
 
 
It is possible to distinguish a geographic split with North American LCCs flying a greater number 
of frequencies per destination compared to European LCCs. easyJet flies to 59 destinations and 
Southwest to 60; however the Texan LCC has a fleet that is four times larger. Southwest clearly 
stands out as the LCC that focuses on increasing frequencies to its destinations rather than 
increasing solely the number of destinations, reflected by the statement that Southwest’s entrance to 
Denver might be the only new destination added to the network in 2006 (Field, 2006). The LCC 
fleet is the U.S. is 1 000 aircraft for a population of 300 million, while in Europe the LCC fleet is 
400 for a population of 400 million (Avery, 2005). With U.S. LCC fleet order books not fulfilled 
the market does not seem saturated; the same can be deduced for the EU market. However, shorter 
distances, lack of visiting-friends-and-relatives market (VFR), and high-speed trains may detract 
from the EU market size (Avery, 2005). 
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Distribution. Distribution is a key focus area for all airlines as the costs associated with selling 
airline service can be a large portion of total costs. The original LCC model called for direct sales, 
but still utilized agents due to technological constraints. However, the Internet opened up a realm of 
possibilities and all airlines, LCC and FSC alike, focus on driving increasing sales via own 
channels. However, some LCCs continue to use traditional channels. With the exceptions of 
Southwest and JetBlue all North American LCCs are found in traditional global distribution 
systems (GDSs). However, many LCCs, both North American and European, have allowed GDSs 
to access fares via a technological link in a move to capture more business travelers (Jonas, 2004). 
As some LCCs begin to target more business travelers it may be necessary to explore alternative 
sales channels, as many corporate buyers are reluctant to lose price comparison ability. To attract a 
larger share of business travelers to an LCC it may be necessary to externally segment customer 
groups, such as all North American LCCs have done through Southwest's SWABiz or JetBlue's 
CompanyBlue, for example. Such programs may not offer ticket discounts, but create travel 
statistics and information for facilitating corporate travel management. Among the European study 
group it is only easyJet that utilizes a clear and distinct tactic to entice the business traveler. Just as 
with LCC frequent flyer programs it is essential that the administration of such a program does not 
complicate the business model, nor create a large cost penalty. 
 
Alliances among LCCs are a recent trend that does not follow the original model. The structure of 
cooperation ranges from codeshare agreements, close agreements with similar-sized carriers, or tie-
ups with smaller, feeder airlines (Howe, 2006; Jones, 2006). America West had codeshare 
agreements with such airlines as Royal Jordanian and Hawaiian, while Southwest has a close 
cooperation with ATA, which provides Pacific-island flights for the LCC, and Frontier utilizes 
feeder carriers to its Denver hub. In Europe, Aer Lingus stands out as being a member of the 
Oneworld alliance, a relic from its days as an FSC, while Sterling codeshares with a select few 
other LCCs. These alliances allow the carriers to expand their networks without expensive 
investments and allow for greater utilization of resources.  
 
Product Adherence. The scoring of LCCs on product characteristics shows that the North American 
market tends to attempt a differentiation strategy, while the relatively young European market 
remains more true to the original LCC model. Air Berlin and Sterling are more product 
differentiated than their European competitors, which represents not only their strategic focus, but 
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may also reflect their long organizational history. These two LCCs are more mature within the 
study group from the European continent, and have been through many organizational and strategic 
changes through the years. Figure 3 summarizes the ranking of LCCs. 
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3.2 Operational Features 
 
An airline’s operational characteristics are influential on the overall cost perspective. Operational 
characteristics measure how well an airline utilizes its fleet, including average daily aircraft 
utilization and average stage length. 
 
Fleet. The LCC model calls for a single aircraft type fleet, which lowers both operational and 
administrative costs (Calder, 2002). Aircraft and crew can be utilized most effectively, maintenance 
simplified, and purchasing economies of scale achieved. However, not all LCCs adhere to this 
mantra. JetBlue has blatantly deviated from the traditional model by purchasing the Embraer 190 to 
Figure 3: Level of LCC product adherence to the original business model (2004) 
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complement their Airbus fleet. The airline intends to use the smaller Embraer on routes that do not 
justify the larger Airbus, and therefore capture higher yield passengers. America West has a mixed 
fleet of long- and short-haul aircraft from both Boeing and Airbus. In Europe, easyJet has a mixed 
fleet of Boeing 737 and Airbus 319, which may be a conscious decision to not become dependent 
upon one manufacturer. Subsequent aircraft acquisition costs can be negotiated lower as easyJet has 
aircraft alternatives. 
 
Aircraft Utilization. A key indicator of efficient use of aircraft is the average daily block hour 
measurement. This measurement indicates an average of how many hours a day an aircraft in an 
airline’s fleet is in operation. The highest performer is JetBlue with its fleet operating more than 13 
hours a day, partly reflective of the carrier’s trans-continental U.S. flights (Seabury Airline Planning 
Group, 2006). The majority of all the studied LCCs have double-digit utilization rates, with the 
exception of Spirit, WestJet, and Sterling. Influential elements in average block hour utilization 
include stage length operations, airport selection, turn-around procedures, and scheduling 
parameters. Secondary airports tend to allow faster inbound, turn-around, and outbound times, 
while how an LCC chooses to schedule its flights has a utilization impact.  
 
Stage length. Short routes are the mainstay of the original LCC model. Originally Southwest 
averaged stage lengths of 400 nautical miles (NM) (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005). The majority of 
LCCs fly a majority of short-haul routes; however JetBlue’s relatively high number trans-
continental flights raise the carrier’s average stage length to nearly three times more than the 
traditional model. Figure 4 depicts the average stage lengths of the LCC study group.  
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It is not possible to discern any geographical segmentation; however it is apparent that many LCCs 
are beginning to operate routes with longer stage lengths. Southwest, JetBlue, and WestJet all 
operate trans-continental flights. Ryanair has an average stage length that is lower than the original 
model, although some operations exceed 1000 NM (Seabury Airline Planning Group, 2006).  
 
Operational Adherence. The operational analyses shows that North American LCCs tend to have a 
greater deviation from the original model, summarized in Figure 5; three out of four carriers with 
50% or less adherence are U.S. LCCs. This deviation stems primarily from differentiated fleets and 
above-average stage lengths. The majority of study group carriers have a relatively high adherence 
level at 67%. Deviation is mainly attributed to below-average block hour utilization and above-
average stage lengths. Southwest, and its imitator, Ryanair, have a 100% operational adherence. 
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3.3 Overall Adherence to the LCC Model 
 
 The results of the analysis shows that North American LCCs tend to have the greatest deviation 
from the traditional model founded in 1971, while European carriers tend to have a higher degree of 
model adherence. The exceptions to this are Air Berlin, Sterling, and Southwest. Southwest 
achieves a 67% overall adherence level, the highest among North American LCCs, which is 
indicative of the airline recognizing the strengths of its business model. Southwest’s deviation is 
mainly attributed to its network and distribution model variance, while operationally it has the 
highest level of adherence.. Ryanair has the highest level of overall business model adherence with 
97%. America West has the greatest deviation with 43%, impacted greatly by its network, reward 
amenities, distribution, and fleet characteristics. While some FSCs implement selected LCC 
characteristics, Aer Lingus has transformed itself from an FSC to an LCC and implemented 
Figure 5: Level of LCC operational adherence to the original business model (2004) 
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substantial elements of the low-cost model (Harrington, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2005). It achieves an 
overall adherence of 63% by incorporating many LCC network and service characteristics. Figure 6 
depicts the level of overall adherence to the LCC model. 
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4. Full-Service Carrier Business Model 
The two-typology air carrier description found in the leading literature may prove to be a simplified 
explanation of reality. The analysis of North American and European low-cost carriers has shown 
that there is a high degree of model variance among LCCs. The following section is a presentation 
of the model variances apparent among North American and European full-service carriers. The 
methodology is identical, although there are 14 carriers in the study group (6 North American and 8 
European) and two characteristics have been omitted (seat assignments and airport location) from 
the FSC analysis as all carriers would provide identical results.  
 
Figure 6: Level of LCC overall adherence to the original business model (2004) 
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4.1 Product Features 
 
Networks and ticketing. Some FSCs have envious networks that span the globe emanating from 
fortress hubs. To bring traffic into these networks all FSCs have connection possibilities, both on-
line and inter-line. Transfer traffic is a vital element to ensure adequate load factors and finances to 
operate some routes in an FSC network. To make on-lining and inter-lining attractive the majority 
of airlines offer through-fares, with the exception of Air Canada, SN Brussels, and BMI. Trip 
restrictions were historically implemented by carriers to maximize revenue, however many LCCs 
have capitalized on this policy by emphasizing ease of travel. Some airlines have responded by 
easing restrictions, most notably Air Canada. The North American carrier offers today one-way 
fares with five fare options incorporating graduated levels of restrictions. The risk of implementing 
a one-way concept is revenue dilution, which can be mitigated by passenger volume increases. To 
complement scheduled operations many airlines enter into charter contracts. The only North 
American carrier to focus on charter flights is Air Canada, which is representative of the low 
penetration of charter flights in the U.S. Some European FSCs, however, pursue charter contracts, 
such as SAS, Finnair, Austrian, SN Brussels, and BMI.  
 
Current FSC network and ticket characteristics are similar to the original model, especially within 
the US market, while Air Canada's restructuring enabled a significant model transformation. The 
European market is more diverse and characterized by models with a high adherence level to the 
original model, although slight nuances are discernable. BMI and SN Brussels are two carriers that 
are challenging this notion currently.  
 
Services. Service levels at FSCs have changed drastically over the past few years and was one cost 
area that was easily targeted following the industry downturn. While all carriers in the study group 
continue to offer frequent-flyer programs and lounges, the in-flight experience varies. Many North 
American FSCs have implemented fee-driven meal service, similar to LCCs, however first and 
business class passengers continue to be catered. However, North American carriers still offer 
complimentary non-alcoholic beverages and American Airlines' contrary test phase did not generate 
acceptable responses (Alexander, 2005). Many carriers are exploring service co-branding 
opportunities, for example, Air Canada and United Airlines to expand their offering and customer 
recognition. The majority of European FSCs continue to offer complimentary meal service, with the 
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exception of SAS, Austrian, and BMI. The majority of FSCs offer a two-class service, business and 
economy; however some carriers have expanded their offering. with United Airlines and SAS both 
operating a three-class cabin in an attempt to generate higher yields.  
 
Distribution. All FSCs continue to utilize GDSs, however the airlines actively push on-line 
distribution, especially through their own channels due to lower costs. In addition, the traditional 
commissions that independent travel agents received from FSCs to reward sales have been 
eliminated by many airlines. Customer segmentation allows carriers to focus sales activities and 
high-yield business traffic is a prime target group. The traditional FSC model calls for dual 
segmentation, however many smaller business customers are ineligible. United Airlines offers high-
yield passengers unique solutions aimed specifically at large or small corporate customers, while 
Air Canada has elected to implement a corporate program similar to those found among North 
American LCCs. Among European FSCs the trend is to follow the traditional business model and 
have two distinct customer segmentations. Nearly all the FSCs are primary, contributing members 
of the three global alliances, except SN Brussels that has elected not to join. 
 
Product Adherence. The degree of product adherence among North American and European FSCs 
is quite high, 60% of the study group has an product adherence degree of 90% or greater, as shown 
in Figure 7. Air France/KLM, Delta, and Lufthansa have strict model adherence, while BMI has the 
lowest model following with 55%. Through-fares, trip restrictions, and inflight service are those 
model characteristics that influence model variance the greatest. There is no apparent geographical 
segmentation as found among the LCC study group, which may be explained by the low 
representation numbers among North American FSCs, the need for differentiation among the high 
number of European FSCs, and the history of FSCs as a country's designated airline.  
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4.2 
Operational Features  
 
Fleet. The traditional FSC fleet commonly consisted of aircraft for fulfilling three roles: regional, 
short-haul, and long-haul service. However, this trait is not as common today. Many FSCs, 
especially in North America, outsource their regional flying and focus on major, trans-continental, 
and international routes. In 2004 Delta Air Lines had 30 short-haul Dornier aircraft in their fleet 
during the timeframe of the analysis, while Air Canada has 60 Embraer aircraft on order (World 
fleet summary.2005). The situation in Europe differs because many FSCs continue to have short-
haul aircraft in their fleets. However, British Airways has effectively utilized the franchising 
concept to outsource regional flying to partners while using the British Airways brand. 
 
Aircraft Utilization. High aircraft utilization is the goal of any airline, however FSCs have an added 
challenge with a connection-driven network and hub coordination is necessary. The average block-
hour for FSCs and their entire system is nine hours per day. Most FSCs are operating near this 
utilization figure, although long, international stage-lengths distort this figure somewhat. 
 
Figure 7: Level of FSC product adherence to the original business model (2004) 
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Stage Length. The average stage length for a European FSC is roughly twice that of an LCC, and 
the average stage length for the North American study group is approximately 1000 NM 
(Association of European Airlines, 2006). This stems partly from the geographical differences 
found between the two continents. While North American carriers have multiple hubs that are 
utilized to effectively cover nearly the entire country, European FSCs are generally limited to a 
single hub that covers their home country. This results in few intra-European long-stage routes.  
 
Operational Adherence. Adherence overall to operational characteristics of the traditional FSC 
model vary greatly between the carriers. Northwest deviates from the pure traditional model by 
83%, which is greatly driven by the carrier’s low block hour and stage lengths, in addition to, its 
fleet characteristics. Austrian and British Airways, however, achieve a 100% operational adherence 
to 
the 
FS
C 
mo
del. 
The
re is 
no 
clea
r 
dist
inct
ion, 
eith
er 
geo
gra
phical or size, to be seen in the results, while stage length and block hours are the main drivers 
behind the deviation from the traditional FSC model. Figure 8 summarizes the results of the level of 
operational adherence to the traditional FSC model. 
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Overall Adherence to the FSC Model. Overall adherence to the traditional FSC model varies from a 
relatively low level of adherence to nearly full adherence. However, the majority of carriers do 
achieve an adherence of 80% or greater. There are two main elements that detract from full 
compliance with the traditional model: in-flight service and operational characteristics. The level of 
in-flight service among FSCs has undergone a drastic change from the complimentary, and 
sometimes exquisite, service to a fee-based service, commonly applicable to domestic or short-haul 
flights. North American carriers continue to offer complimentary non-alcoholic beverages, while 
some European FSCs are able to charge for all offerings. Operational characteristics vary among the 
FSC study group, especially regarding block hour usage and stage lengths. The lowest level of 
overall adherence is 54% from BMI. BMI has adopted many traits of LCCs, such as removing 
restrictions and limiting through-fares. The results of the FSC level of adherence are presented in 
Figure 9 below. 
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 Figure 9: Level of FSC overall adherence to the original business model (2004) 
Figure 8: Level of FSC operational adherence to the original business model (2004) 
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5. Model Adherence and Profitability Impact 
Profitability is a relationship between internal and external factors, and the business model that a 
carrier elects to utilize. The analyses have shown that the current airline classification of low-cost 
carriers and full-service carriers may be too rigid, and does not accurately describe the business 
model and its nuances of the carrier study group. This section will analyze the level of relation 
between a chosen model and its impact on profitability. Analyzing 2004 operating revenue and 
expenses, as well as, operating margin enable performance measurement among the two study 
groups (The world's top 10 low-cost carriers 2004.2005; The world's top 25 airlines 2004.2005; 
World airline financial results 2004.2005). Operating margin measures the proportion of remaining 
operational revenue after paying operational expenses. This section is structured with an analysis of 
the LCC study group followed by the FSC airlines.  
 
5.1 LCC Profitability 
 
The LCC market has not been immune from such market forces as increasing competition, high fuel 
prices, and a challenging yield environment. Five LCC carriers of the study group posted negative 
operating profits, however, as a whole, the group had an average profit margin several points better 
than the FSC study group (The world's top 10 low-cost carriers 2004.2005; The world's top 25 
airlines 2004.2005; World airline financial results 2004.2005).  
 
The results show that there is a positive relationship between an LCC's level of adherence to the 
original model with the carrier's operating margin. A linear regression of the two variables, LCC 
level of model adherence and operating margin, produce a regression coefficient3 of r2=0.6209. 
Figure 10 visually plots the two variables accompanied by a trend line. 
                                                 
3 A linear regression coefficient, also known as r2, shows the level of correlation between two variables. A maximum 
coefficient of 1, r2=1, indicates a perfect correlation between the variables, while the minimum achievable coefficient 
of 0, r2=0, indicates no distinguishable correlation.  
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In other words, Ryanair adheres to the traditional LCC model 97% and has the highest operating 
margin, 25%, among the LCC study group. The opposite case is Spirit, which has the second lowest 
level of adherence with 47% and the poorest operating margin of negative 11%. The results show 
that more strict adherence to the traditional LCC model result in a higher higher operating margin. 
The differentiation strategies LCCs choose to implement have an overall negative impact on 
operational margins. The further the LCC moves from the traditional model, the poorer the financial 
results.  
 
5.2 FSC Profitability 
 
The FSC correlation analysis ommits one carrier, Delta Air Lines. This carrier was an extreme 
outlier in the sample with a large negative profit margin due to extraordinary financial charges in 
2004. The results also show a positive correlation between a high level of adherence to the 
traditional FSC model and a high operating margin. However, the regression coefficient, r2=0.5166, 
is too low to state with an as high a level of confidence as with the LCC correlation that adherence 
to the traditional FSC model leads to a higher profit margin. However, the results do show a 
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Figure 10: LCC correlation between overall business model adherence and operating margin (2004) 
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discernable positive correlation between model adherence and profit margin. Figure 11 shows the 
plot of adherence level with profit margin. 
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Both British Airways and Lufthansa have the highest level of adherence, 96%, and the highest 
profit margins, 7% and 5% respectively. While BMI has the lowest level of adherence with 62% 
and a profit margin of 0%. Among the correlation study group SN Brussels has the lowest profit 
margin of negative 5% and the fourth lowest level of adherence to the traditional FSC model.  
 
These results show that those FSCs that attempt to adopt some LCC characteristics may negatively 
impact their operational profit margins, unless they simultaneously aggressively lower their costs. 
Attempts to migrate from the traditional FSC model may only result in increased dilution of 
operating revenue. Differentiation through simplification must be accompanied by a reduction in 
cost per available seat kilometer.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The analyses results show that the stringent classification of airlines into either an LCC or FSC 
grouping inadequately illustrates the nuances found in current business models. Model 
differentiation characteristics are blurred when such simplified monikers are applied. The LCC 
Figure 11: FSC correlation between overall business model adherence and operating margin (2004) 
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study group shows a high degree of differentiation, especially among North American carriers and 
more mature European carriers. Model variance among differentiating carriers on both continents is 
most discernable within the network regime, especially among connection and through-fare 
possibilities. North American carriers’ model discrepancy is mainly attributed to their choice of 
service offerings and distribution tactics. Among European LCCs the impact from operational 
choices results in model variance. The correlation analysis has shown a positive link between 
original business model adherence and operational profitability. The data suggests that a sufficiently 
higher yield is not attainable through model variance.  
 
Among the FSC study group there is less tendency to veer from the original business model and 
there is little differentiation among the study group. The little variance found among the carriers is 
mainly attributed to service offering differentiation. Deviation from operational characteristics, such 
as stage lengths and aircraft utilization figures, is the main catalysts for variance. Correlation results 
have shown that deviation from the original business model have a negative impact on operational 
financial results. More stringent adherence to the original full-service model tends to result in 
improved figures.  
 
The overall study has attempted to quantify the differences found among some of North America’s 
and Europe’s largest LCCs and FSCs. The results show that applying differentiating features in an 
attempt to gain a competitive advantage may dilute operational performance; in other words, 
Porter’s notion of stuck in the middle is highly applicable within this context (Porter, 1985). While 
LCCs may adjust their business models to attract higher yield passengers and FSCs alter their 
business models striving for simplification without lowering their yields, the opposite may be true.   
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Turbulens og overlevelse 
 
Hvorfor forsvinder store kendte virksomheder? Dette spørgsmål stillede Arie de Geus i 1997 i 
publikationen, ”The Living Company”. Baggrunden var hans påvisning af, at en tredjedel af de 
selskaber, der var placeret på FORTUNE 500 listen i 1970 var forsvundet fra FORTUNE 500 listen 
i 1983. Andre studier (eksempelvis Seifert, 2002) har påvist store fald i virksomhedernes 
gennemsnitlige levetid. Samme emne var også hovedtemaet i Hamal og Prahalads betydningsfulde 
bog fra 1994 ”Competing for the Future”.  
  
Hovedsvaret på spørgsmålet har været, at der er for megen ”status quo management”, og at 
virksomhederne reagerer for sent strategisk og ledelsesmæssigt, når der opstår turbulens i en 
branche.  
 
Turbulens kan være mere eller mindre omfattende, ligesom også hurtigheden i forandringen af en 
branches form og indhold kan variere betydeligt. De mest afgørende forandringsfaktorer, der skaber 
turbulens, er deregulering og teknologiske ændringer. Hertil kan komme investorskift, ændringer i 
forbrugerpræferencer og forbrugeradfærd mv.  
 
Forbrugeradfærdsforandringer er ofte relativt langsomme, fordi forbrugeradfærd er baseret på vaner 
og demografiske faktorer, der ikke ændrer sig så hurtigt, ligesom forandringer kan kræve ny læring 
hos forbrugeren, og dette vil ofte tage tid.  
 
Ved deregulering ændres den statslige regulering og evt. den internationale regulering. De 
eksisterende virksomheder og de nye aktører skal afdække og udforme den ny branche. Det gælder 
eksempelvis luftfartsbranchen. 
 
Ved teknologiske forandringer søger de eksisterende toneangivende virksomheder ofte at holde fast 
i reguleringen længe efter, at teknologi og forbrugeradfærd er skiftet, hvorved de mister 
konkurrencekraft. De er for langsomme til at ændre strategi og ledelse og til at tilpasse værdikæder 
og produktionsprocesser til de ændrede brancheforhold. Det er for eksempel tilfældet med 
musikindustrien, hvor de store pladeselskaber klynger sig til reguleringen (rettigheder, 
prisfastsættelse etc.), selv om branchen er omformet og forbrugeradfærden skiftet. 
  
Virksomheder kan være uvillige til at ville ændre strategi og ledelse, og de kan være ude af stand til 
at ændre eksisterende processer i tide, hvilket kan give nye aktører tid og plads til at få fodfæste og 
position i branchen. Udviklingen i luftfartsbranchen de senere år er et eksempel på en turbulens 
ledsaget af en sådan adfærd. 
 
 
Luftfartsbranchen i Europa 
 
Luftfarten har været under kraftig statslig regulering frem til dereguleringen i USA i 1978 (the 
Airline Deregulation Act) og i EU ved liberaliseringer af branchen i perioden 1988 til 1997. 
 
Trods læringsmulighederne fra den voldsomme deregulering i USA, og trods den mere gradvise 
deregulering i Europa, må det konstateres, at luftfartsselskaberne i Europa i meget lang tid holdt sig 
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til ”status quo management” og igennem lang tid ikke viste hverken villighed eller evne til 
forandring.  
 
Villighed til forandring ses gennem ændret strategi og ledelse, mens evne til forandring ses gennem 
ændring af værdikæder, forretningsområder og produktionsprocesser.  
 
Sheth et al (2006) har opstillet en model til klassificering af virksomhedernes reaktion på turbulens. 
Denne vises i figur 1. 
 
 
Figur 1 Klassifikation af virksomheders reaktion på brancheturbulens 
 
                  Ability to change 
   Yes No 
Willingness to 
change Yes 
Adaptive 
company 
Captive 
company 
 No 
Arrogant 
company 
 
Legacy 
company 
Kilde: Sheth et al, 2006. 
 
 
Mange flyselskaber har i for lang tid været at betragte som ”legacy companies” og har herefter 
begyndt en forandringsproces, der i for begrænset omfang har haft tilpasning til turbulens som 
strategisk indhold.  Ofte er tilpasningen iværksat som en blanding af ”captive companies” og 
”arrogant companies” tiltag, hvor faren for at blive ”stuck in the middle”4 mellem skift i strategi og 
ledelse på den ene side, og skift i værdikæder, produktionsprocesser og forretningsgrundlag på den 
anden side ikke fører til konkurrencedygtig tilpasning til branchens ny form og indhold.  
 
For at virksomheden kan blive et ”adaptive company”, dvs., kan få en konkurrencedygtig strategisk 
forandringsproces gennemført, kræves: 
• Ændret uortodoks tankegang med betydelig ’delearning’ 
• Strukturelle forandringer, rekonstruktion og identifikation af værdikæder og 
profitcentre 
• Ændrede aflønnings- og belønningssystemer 
 
 
Ledelse af gennemførelsen af en strategisk forandringsproces kræver ofte: 
• Ny ledelse/bestyrelse 
• Udpegning af en ”kronprins” til at forestå ændringerne i virksomheden 
• ’Buy outs’ 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Ikke ” stuck in the middle” i Michael Porters forstand som en blanding af generiske strategier, men som ”stuck in the 
middle” mellem strategi og ledelse på den ene side og implementering af forandringsprocesser på den anden side (Lise 
Lyck 2006). 
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Mere passivt kan der være tale om indgåelse i en fusion eller om virksomhedsophør. 
 
Hamel og Prahalad (1994) fandt, at ledelsens tidsanvendelse var uhensigtsmæssig og i strid med 
virksomhedens overordnede mål. Der blev brugt for lidt tid på fremadrettet virksomhed, og for 
megen tid på det bestående og på fortiden. De fandt det derfor vigtigt at sondre mellem strategisk 
planlægning og strategisk arkitektur og fandt, at traditionel strategisk planlægning kunne være farlig 
at anvende, når der var turbulens, fordi turbulens kræver brug af strategisk arkitektur. De to 
begreber er vist i oversigt 1 på side 5 for at vise forskellen mellem begreberne.  
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Oversigt 1 Strategisk planlægning og strategisk arkitektur 
 
 
 
 
 
Planning goal 
 
 
 
 
Planning process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planning resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Planning 
 
 
? Incremental 
improvement in 
market share and 
position  
 
? Formulaic and 
ritualistic  
 
? Existing industry 
and market structure 
as the base line  
 
? Industry structure 
analysis 
(segmentation 
analysis, value chain 
analysis, cost 
structure analysis, 
competitor 
benchmarking, etc.) 
 
? Tests for fit between 
resources and plans 
 
? Capital budgeting 
and allocation of 
resources among 
competing projects  
 
? Individual 
businesses as the 
unit of analysis 
 
 
? Business unit 
executives  
 
? Few experts  
 
? Staff driven 
 
 
 
Crafting Strategic 
Architecture 
 
? Rewriting industry 
rules and creating 
new competitive 
space 
 
? Exploratory and 
open-ended 
 
? An understanding of 
discontinuities and 
competencies as the 
base line  
 
? A search for new 
functionalities or 
new ways of 
delivering new 
opportunities 
 
? Development of 
plans for 
competence 
acquisition and 
migration   
 
? Development 
opportunity 
approach plans  
 
? The corporation as 
the unit of analysis  
 
 
 
? Many managers  
 
? The collective 
wisdom of the 
company 
 
? Line and staff driven 
(Hamel og Prahalad, 1994).
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Som en form for test af virksomhedens ansattes forståelse af de krav, som turbulens 
stiller til en virksomhed, præsenterede Hamel og Prahalad et spørgeskema, som kunne 
udfyldes før læsning af bogen ” Competing for the Future”, samt et skema med 20 
spørgsmål, der kunne besvares efter læsning af bogen. Tanken hermed var at lægge op til 
proaktiv forandringsorienteret tænkning og adfærd. Disse to skemaer er vedhæftet i 
appendiks 1 til denne præsentation med henblik på egen aktiv refleksion over strategi, 
ledelse og gennemførelse af forandringsprocesser inden for luftfart.  
 
 
 
Luftfartens udvikling i de senere år 
 
Dereguleringen af den europæiske luftfart i de seneste fem år har medført store 
forandringer: 
 
• Antallet af flyafgange er i de største lufthavne i Europa samlet 
forøget fra 2000-2004 med: 
 
Årstal Antal take-off og landinger (i 1000) 
2000 7937,9 
2004 8548,6 
Kilde: European Commission (2005). 
 
Ovenstående tal viser en procentuel stigning på 7,7 %. 
 
• Antallet af passagerer er i de største lufthavne i Europa samlet 
forøget fra 2000-2004 med: 
 
Årstal Antal Passagerer (i millioner) 
2000 737,71 
2004 766,24 
Kilde: European Commission (2005). 
 
Ovenstående tal viser en procentuel stigning på 3,87 %. 
 
 
• Priserne for flyrejser er faldet voldsomt fra 2000-2005 
 
• Nye aktører – lavprisflyselskaber – har fået solidt fodfæste. Fra 
en markedsandel på ca. 5 pct. i år 2000 til ca. 20 pct. i år 2005 (se 
tabel 2). 
 
• Store forandringer i de traditionelle flyselskabers 
konkurrenceposition. 
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• Betydelig tilpasning til forbrugerpræferencer 
? Lavere priser 
? Flere valgmuligheder 
? Større fleksibilitet 
? Færre tidsmæssige restriktioner på ud - og hjemrejser  
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Tabel 1 Passagertal og markedsandele for europæiske flyselskaber 
2004 Antal passagerer  Samlet markedsandel 
AEA 
selskaber      
SAS 20.378.600 5,2%
KLM 20.386.200 5,2%
Air France 45.368.900 11,6%
British 
Airways 35.462.500 9,1%
Lufthansa 48.255.400 12,4%
SpanAir 5.644.400 1,4%
Øvrige AEA 131.516.900 33,7%
      
AEA Total  307.012.900 78,7%
      
ELFAA 
selskaber     
Air Berlin  13.800.000 3,5%
Ryan Air 27.500.000 7,1%
Sterling 1.800.000 0,5%
EasyJet* 24.300.000 6,2%
Øvrige ELFAA 15.500.000 4,0%
      
ELFAA samlet 82.900.000 21,3%
      
Total  389.912.900 100%
      
Note: Datamateriale er indsamlet fra de to store Europæiske 
brancheforeninger (AEA og ELFAA) og omfatter derfor kun tal fra 
flyselskaber der er medlemmer af disse, og tabellen giver derfor 
kun et approksimativt billede af det samlede Europæiske 
passagertal.   
      
* Note: Easyjet er først optaget i ELFAA fra oktober 2005, så 
deres passagertal er fra Easyjets egen årsrapport 
      
Kilder: www.aea.be og www.elfaa.com og www.easyjet.com 
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For flyselskaberne har en tilpasning været nødvendig. Det har i næsten alle tilfælde ført 
til introduktion af en strategi med fokus på omkostningsreduktioner, en defensiv strategi, 
med det formål at standse lavprisflyselskabernes fremmarch. Strategien kan ikke siges at 
være vellykket, jf. tabel 2. 
 
 
Tabel 2      
Markedsandele for lavprisflyselskaber udregnet for ASK i procent. 
2001 2002 2003 2004   
6 9 12 19   
Kilde: Cassotis, 2005 
 
 
 
SAS og Air France/KLM og deres strategi 
 
Nærværende afsnit omfatter først en kort præsentation af de tre selskaber med fokus på 
deres identitet og udvikling. Herefter følger en analyse af deres strategivalg og 
konsekvenserne heraf målt på kort sigt.  
 
 
Selskabspræsentation 
  
SAS  
 
 
• I 1946 blev SAS dannet via en fusion mellem Det Danske Luftfartselskab A/S 
(DDL), Det Norske Luftfartsselskap A/S (DNL) og Svensk Interkontinental 
Lufttrafik AB (SILA).  
 
• SAS blev i 1983 kåret som "Airline of the Year", og var i 1997 med til at 
grundlægge Star Alliance.   
 
• SAS var først kendt for fremsynet teknik, senere for service og præcision og for 
business service både i lufthavne og fly, for skandinavisk venlighed og engageret 
personale 
 
• SAS har i dag ca. 28.000 ansatte globalt, og havde i 2004 omkring 20,3 millioner 
passagerer, samt en markedsandel på 5,2 pct.  
 
• Star alliance startede i 1992, hvor Air Canada og United Airlines dannede en 
alliance 
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• SAS blev opsplittet i tre nationale selskaber i 2004: Scandinavian Airlines 
Danmark, SAS Braathens, Scandinavian Airlines Sverige, og et fælles oversøisk 
selskab, Scandinavian Airlines International. SAS er børsnoteret i både 
Stockholm, Oslo og København. 
 
 
 
 
 40 
KLM 
 
 
• I oktober 1919 blev KLM Royal Dutch Airlines dannet af Albert Plesman i 
Holland, og er derved det ældste flyselskab i verden, som stadig har sit 
oprindelige navn. 
 
• I 1946 etablerede KLM som det første europæiske flyselskab en rute over 
Atlanterhavet, fra Amsterdam til New York. 
 
• I 1989 indgik KLM en alliance med Northwest Airlines 
 
• I 1996 opkøbte KLM Kenya Airways 
 
• I maj 2004 blev fusionen mellem KLM og Air France en realitet. 
 
• KLM har ca. 35.000 ansatte på verdensplan, og transporterer årligt næsten 20,4 
mio. passagerer, samt mere end 600.000 tons kargo. 
 
• KLM gruppen flyver til 128 byer i 65 lande 
 
• I 2004/2005 havde KLM en omsætning på 91 mio. euro, samt 2004 en 
markedsandel på 5,2 pct. 
 
 
Air France 
 
 
• Air France blev etableret i oktober 1933, og dets historie har været kendetegnet af 
adskillige milepæle.  
 
• I 1997 fusionerede Air France med Air Inter, og i juni 2000 indgik Air France og 
Delta Airlines sammen med Aeroméxico og Korean Air i SkyTeam alliancen 
 
• Air France havde i 2004 over 45 millioner passagerer, og flyver til over 200 
destinationer i 90 lande 
 
• Air France har mere end 71,000 ansatte på verdensplan 
 
• Omsætningen for 2005 var på over 19 mia. euro, og Air France har en 
markedsandel på 11,6 pct. 
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Strategivalg og konsekvenser 
 
Såvel SAS som Air France og KLM kom sent i gang med deres strategiske tilpasning til 
den turbulens, som dereguleringen har forårsaget inden for luftfartsbranchen. Det er 
interessant at konstatere, at selv om selskaberne har haft fokus på lavere omkostninger, 
har deres strategivalg været vidt forskellige.  
 
SAS præsenterede den ny strategi benævnt ”Turnaround 2005” i slutningen af 2002. Det 
centrale i strategien er en opsplitning af det hidtidige selskab i tre nationale selskaber 
(hhv. dansk, norsk og svensk) og med opgivelse af navnet SAS som eneste fælles 
identitet, samt et selskab for oversøiske flyrejser (long haul). Det vil sige en strategi, hvor 
grænseoverskridende ejerskab forsvinder som struktur, og hvor volumeneffekten 
formindskes.  
 
Air France og KLM valgte en helt anden strategi i form af en fusionsstrategi, med 
bibeholdelse af begge navne, men med Air France som ledende part. Det vil sige, at 
strategivalget indebærer en grænseoverskridende dimension og en forøget vægt på 
volumen og stordriftsfordele, der skal lede til lavere omkostninger og forøget 
konkurrencedygtighed.  
 
På nuværende tidspunkt er det muligt at se på de hidtidige resultater af de to strategivalg 
og vurdere udviklingen på kort sigt. 
 
Turnaround-planen har resulteret i besparelser på over 14 milliarder svenske kroner, og 
har desuden resulteret i, at SAS-koncernen i 2005 fik et om end beskedent positivt 
regnskabsresultat på 255 millioner svenske kroner. SAS har gennemført besparelser på 30 
pct. Udviklingen inden for branchen betyder, at der i 2006 er planlagt yderligere 
besparelser på 2 milliarder svenske kroner, der omfatter besparelse på piloter og 
kabinepersonale mv. SAS’s strategi kan primært karakteriseres som en generisk 
omkostningsstrategi, der fokuserer på besparelser. 
 
Air France/KLM strategien har været vækstorienteret, og med vægt på globalisering med 
et europæisk udgangspunkt. 
 
Resultaterne for selskaberne fremgår af figurerne og tabellerne vist på side 10 til 12, hvor 
antal passagerer (PAX), til rådighedsværende flysædekilometre (ASK) og indtjening i 
passagerkilometre (RPK) vises fra 2000 til 2005 for SAS, Air France og KLM. 
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Sam m enligning af PAX
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2002 2003 2004 2005
SAS 22,896 20,456 23,961 25,015
Air 43,421 43,490 41,239 47,142
KLM 19,956 18,719 18,997 21,510
PAX = Passengers carried (millions)
 
 
Sam m enligning af ASK
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
SAS 33.781,80 35.520,90 34.096 33.332 39.233,18 38.453,79
Air France 108.319,40 117.485,30 129.469 131.647 129.000,51 147.102,91
KLM 69.437,10 68.975,90 73.813 72.409 71.077,02 81.863,87
ASK = Available seat kilometres
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Sam m enligning af RPK
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
SAS 22.647,30 22.955,60 24.170 23.020 26.826,87 27.724,24
Air France 85.119,10 88.283 98.508 99.073 98.639,70 115.879,10
KLM 55.705,60 53.758,80 59.181 56.540 58.332,75 68.322,24
RPK = Revenue Passenger Kilometres
 
 
Nedenstående tabel viser RPK (Revenue Passenger Kilometres) delt med ASK (Available 
Seat Kilometres), dvs. viser værdien af belægningsgraden for selskaberne. 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
SAS 0,67 0,65 0,71 0,69 0,68 0,72
Air France 0,79 0,75 0,76 0,75 0,76 0,79
KLM 0,8 0,78 0,8 0,78 0,82 0,83
RPK / ASK 
 
 
 
Tabellerne og figurerne viser, at Air France/KLM har opnået et relativt bedre resultat i 
den forløbne periode sammenlignet med SAS.  
 
Men hensyn til image gælder, at SAS fra at være forbundet med:  
• Business  
• Punktlighed  
• Service  
• Medarbejdertilfredshed 
• Kvalitet 
 
 
I dag snarere er forbundet med:  
• Dårlig service 
• Manglende præcision 
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• Strejker 
• Utilfredse medarbejdere 
 
Men også med positive forandringer som: 
• One way-konceptet 
• Bonus Point  
 
 
Med hensyn til det image, som Air France/KLM har, gælder: 
• Oprindeligt to meget nationale selskaber, Air France med en 
Europaprofil og KLM med en oversøisk profil 
 
I dag: 
• En global europæisk profil 
• Solide ’value for money’ produkter 
• Produkter, der er lette at købe  
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Fremtiden i luftfartsbranchen 
 
Selvom det er svært at forudsige hvad der fremover vil ske i branchen da den stadig er 
under udformning og rekonstruktion, skal afslutningsvist opridses nogle trends for den 
fortsatte udvikling. Dette sker velvidende, at branchen ikke har fundet sin endelige form 
og indhold.  
 
1. Ryan Air-modellen er økonomisk effektiv, og vil blive efterlignet. Den bygger på: 
 
• En fuldstændig omkostningstilpasning ud fra en helhedsbetragtning 
• Vægt på tilgængelighed fra afgangsdestination til 
ankomstdestination udover selve flytransporten, fx ved at indgå 
aftaler om billige togbilletter fra Stansted til London 
• En model hvor indtjening ikke er på transporten men på yderligere 
services, såsom tilgængelighed, og salg af enkeltprodukter. Det 
drejer sig om produkter, der er yderst attraktive ud fra et 
forbrugersynspunkt, dvs. produkter af høj kvalitet, der samtidig er 
billige. 
• Der er fokus på oplevelsesøkonomiske elementer, idet det ikke er 
kendt hvilke produkter der sælges i forvejen, og der er en betydelig 
variation i tilbuddene til forbrugeren i årets løb. 
 
 
2. Der vil blive et differentieret udbud af forskellige fly-produkter til forbrugerne. 
Dette ligger helt på linie med den almindelige globaliseringsudvikling. 
 
3. Der vil blive fokuseret på kernekonkurrencefaktorer. Nogle af de vigtigste vil 
blive let tilgang til billigt brændstof og energiøkonomiske fly. 
 
4. Der vil ske yderligere fusioner 
 
 
Udover disse trends vil et afgørende hovedspørgsmål blive: Hvordan åbnes 
konkurrencesituationen for lavprisfly på langdistanceflyvninger? 
 
Og hvordan dereguleres, så der opstår et verdensmarked? 
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Appendiks 1. Strategisk konkurrencedygtig tilpasning 
 
Hamel & Prahalad skrev i 1994 bogen ”Competing for the Future”. På side 2 i deres bog 
præsenteres et spørgeskema, der tænkes udfyldt før læsning af bogen (se skema 1). 
 
På side 294 er endnu et skema med 20 spørgsmål (se skema 2), der tænkes brugt efter 
læsning af bogen. Formålet er en proaktiv refleksion over strategi og lederadfærd. Begge 
skemaer er kopieret i dette appendiks til høflig selvbetjening med henblik på udfyldelse, 
refleksion og diskussion efter denne konference. 
 
 
 
Venlig hilsen 
 
 
 
Lise Lyck 
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 Skema 1 – Situationsvurdering  
(sæt ring om din opfattelse af den nuværende situation). 
 
 
 
 How senior management’s point of view  
about the future stack up against that of competitors? 
 
Conventional          ●  ●     ●        ●           ●  Distinctive  
and Reactive         and Far-sighted 
 
Which issue is absorbing more of senior management’s attention? 
 
Reengineering           ●             ●     ●        ●           ●  Reengineering  
Core Processes        Core Strategies 
 
Within the industry, do competitors  
view our company as more of a rule-taker or a rule-maker? 
 
Mostly a                 ●             ●     ●        ●           ●  Mostly a  
Rule-taker         Rule-maker 
 
What are we better at, improving operational efficiency  
Or creating fundamentally new businesses? 
 
Operational                ●             ●     ●        ●           ●  New Business  
Efficiency         Development 
 
What percentage of our advantage-building efforts focus on catching  
up with competitors versus building advantage new to the industry? 
 
Mostly                  ●             ●     ●        ●           ●  Mostly  
Catching up         New to the 
to others          Industry 
 
To what extent has our transformation agenda been set by competitors’  
actions versus being set by our own unique vision of the future? 
 
Largely                  ●             ●     ●        ●           ●  Largely   
Driven by          Driven by  
Competitors         Our Vision  
 
To what extent am I, as a senior manager, a maintenance engineer  
working on the present or an architect designing the future? 
 
Mostly an                ●             ●     ●        ●           ●  Mostly an  
Engineer          Architect  
 
Among employees, what is the balance between anxiety and hope? 
 
Mostly                ●             ●     ●        ●           ●  Mostly  
Anxiety          Hope  
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Skema 2 – tyve spørgsmål om fremtiden 
 
 
Ja Nej Del- 
vist 
Ved 
Ikke 
Does senior management have a clear and collective point of view 
about how the future will be or could be different? 
 
    
Do senior managers see themselves as industry revolutionaries or are 
they content with the status quo? 
 
    
Does senior management have a clear and collective point of view 
about how the future will be or could be different? 
 
    
Does the company have a clear and collective agenda for building core 
competencies, deploying new functionalities and evolving the customer 
interface? 
 
    
Is top management allocating as much time and intellectual energy to 
pre-market competition as to market competition? 
 
    
Is the company exercising an influence over industry evolution that is 
disproportionately large, given the company’s resources? 
    
Do all employees share an aspiration for the enterprise and possess a 
clear sense of the legacy they are working to build?  
    
Is there a significant amount of stretch in that aspiration –that is, does it 
exceed current resources by a substantial amount 
    
Has senior management operationalized the aspiration into a clear set 
of corporate challenges? 
    
Is it clear to everyone in the company how their individual contribution 
links into the company’s overall aspiration? 
    
Have managers clearly identified current corporate and industry 
conventions and subjected those conventions to close scrutiny? 
    
Are the conditions under which the firm’s existing economic engine 
might run out of steam clear to all managers? 
    
Do employees at all possess a deep sense of urgency about the 
challenge of sustaining success? 
    
Does the firm’s opportunity horizon extend sufficiently beyond the 
boundaries of existing product markets? 
    
Is there an explicit process for identifying and exploiting opportunities 
that lie between or transcend individual business units? 
    
Does the management and allocation of core competencies receive as 
explicit attention as the management and allocation of more tangible 
resources? 
    
Are there a sufficient number of ongoing marketplace experiments to 
ensure that the company learns faster than rivals about the precise 
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location of tomorrow’s opportunities? 
Does the firm have a capacity for global preemption (either using its 
own infrastructure or piggy-backing on partners)? 
    
Have all potential opportunities for resource leverage been fully 
exploited? 
    
Are senior executives confident that they will leave a legacy to future 
managers and employees that exceed the legacy they themselves 
inherited? 
    
Are you having fun?     
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